The Problem with the Problem of Evil

by

Andrew Stockment

Andrew82.net

The Problem with the Problem of Evil

Copyright © 2000 by Andrew Stockment. All Rights Reserved.

Published by Andrew82.net.

Reproduction of this work in its paper form for circulation without charge is permitted, provided that the work is not altered or edited in any way and that it is reproduced in its entirety, including this copyright notice. Duplication or re-publication for any other purpose or in any other form , including publishing it on the internet, are strictly prohibited.

Except as outlined above, this work may not be reproduced, published, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means—for example, electronic, photocopying, recording, e-mail, publishing on the internet—without the prior written permission of the author. Embedded hyperlinks are strictly prohibited. All hyperlinks to this document must be of the form: <A HREF="http://www.andrew82.net/articles/philosophy/ProblemofEvil/" TARGET="_top">

An electronic version of this work is available online at:
http://www.andrew82.net

The author can be contacted via e-mail at:
andrew@andrew82.net

Section I: Introduction

     In the realm of metaphysics, there are many arguments regarding the existence of God¹. Some arguments are for the existence of God (such as the ontological argument) and some are against the existence of God (such as the problem of evil²). Many people claim that the problem of evil is the best argument against the existence of God. However, if it is the best argument against the existence of God, theists have little to fear. The problem of evil fails to disprove the existence of God. Rather, it can be used to prove that God does exist. In this paper, I will demonstrate the problem with the problem of evil.

     First, I will present the problem of evil. Next, I will explain how the problem of evil is a problem of internal inconsistency. Once I reach this point, it will be necessary to define what is meant by the terms: omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and evil. Then, I will explain why the atheist cannot generate the problem of evil. Lastly, I will present the theist’s simple solution to the problem of evil.

Section II: The Problem of Evil

     The problem of evil is an argument that attempts to disprove the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (all-good) God based on the existence of evil in the world. The argument is:

1.       God is a being that is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.

2.       Such a being would not allow evil to exist.

3.       Evil exists.

4.       Therefore, God (as defined in premise 1) does not exist.

This argument is valid, which means that if its premises are true, the conclusion follows necessarily. However, theists do not accept the premises, especially premise (2). Thus, most theists solve the problem of evil by refuting the second premise.

Section III: The Problem of Evil is one of Internal Inconsistency

     To have a proper understanding of the problem of evil, it is essential to realize that the problem is one of internal inconsistency of a theological position. The question is not whether a theological position contradicts another theistic system or an atheist’s views. Rather, the question is whether or not the theological system contradicts itself. The implication for the atheist (or other critic of theism) is that “he must specify a problem which actually arises within the views held by some theist.”³ This is, of course, easy to do if the atheist is free to attribute some of his own views to the theist and then to tell the theist that there is a problem. That there would then be a problem is obvious, but it would not be a problem of internal inconsistency.

     However, despite this fact, many atheistic attacks on theistic systems for the theistic systems’ supposed failure to sufficiently handle the problem of evil amount to nothing more than a rejection of the theist’s account of God, evil, free will, or some other such critical concept. While atheists are free to claim that the theist’s account of these things is flawed, he is not free to claim that a theist cannot solve his problem of evil⁴ on such a basis. If the theist is able, given his account of things, to resolve the problem of evil as generated by his own system, then his system is internally consistent, regardless of whether the atheist agrees with the theist’s account of things. Once one realizes that the issue is one of internal inconsistency, one will find that most theistic systems can solve their supposed problems of evil—that they are internally consistent.

Section IV: Definitions of Key Terms

     Now that we have established that it is the theist who defines the terms (concepts) contained in the argument, let us examine how he defines them.⁵ God’s omnipotence refers to His ability to do anything that is logically possible (and that is consistent with His character). To say that omnipotence is the ability to do whatever is logically possible is not to limit omnipotence, because to create or do something that is logically impossible is to create a contradiction, and “nothing which implies a contradiction falls under the omnipotence of God,”⁶ for a contradiction is nothing. A round square is meaningless contradiction—it is nothing. C. S. Lewis says of omnipotence:

[God’s] omnipotence means power to do all that is intrinsically possible [logically possible], not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to Him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to His power. If you choose to say “God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it,” you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them the two other words “God can.” It remains true that all things are possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things but nonentities. It is no more possible for God than for the weakest of His creatures to carry out both of two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because His power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it [nonsense] about God.⁷

     Closely related to the God’s omnipotence is his omniscience. To say that God is omniscient is to say that God knows everything, including the future. Thus, God is perfectly capable of eliminating any evil that He chooses to eliminate, for He knows about it and has the power to dispel it.

     An omnibenevolent being is all good at all times. God’s omnibenevolence means that everything He does is good. Thus, things are deemed good or evil depending on how they compare to God’s omnibenevolent character.⁸ Anything that is in accord with God’s character is good and anything that is not in accord with His character is evil.

     Evil is customarily divided into two categories—moral evil and natural evil.⁹ Moral evil refers to evils committed by people (such as murder or theft). Moral evil can best be defined as acts, unauthorized by God, that cause others to suffer. Natural evil refers to evils that are caused by impersonal forces in nature (such as hurricanes and plagues) that cause suffering.

Section V: The Atheist Cannot Generate the Problem

     The atheist is free to object to the theist’s definitions. However, the theist can point out that the atheist is in no position to even generate the so-called problem of evil.¹⁰ The atheist cannot generate the problem of evil without borrowing concepts from the theist in order to defeat the theist’s position, which is, of course, absurd. The atheist cannot speak meaningfully about the existence of good and evil without assuming the existence of an objective standard for determining good an evil. For if he does not, that is, if he is a moral subjectivist (or moral relativist), he must admit that one foundation of morality (including the theist’s) is as good as another. Therefore, he cannot object to the theist’s definitions and standard of morality.

     However, this is just the beginning of the atheist’s problems. Without an objective standard, the atheist cannot even justify the third premise—“evil exists.” He is forced to concede that “evil” refers not to something that actually exists but to something he personally dislikes. When the atheist, then, says that evil exists, “he is not challenging his opponent, not arguing, not debating, only ‘sharing his feelings.’… [His] claim is like ‘I itch,’ not ‘I know.’”¹¹ Moreover, without an objective standard, moral truths can vary from person to person. John may say that it is evil for Fred to steal his car, but Fred may say that it is good to steal John’s car. John could not say that stealing really is evil, for he has no absolute standard to fall back upon. He is forced to concede that it is only his opinion that it is evil for Fred to steal his car. At which point Fred will say that it is his opinion that it is good to steal John’s car. Thus, an act could be both good and evil, moral and immoral, at the same time. That is, the act would be neither good nor evil. For if John is right when he says an act is not-good (evil) and Fred is right when he says the same act is not-evil (good), then the act is simultaneously not-good and not-evil—neither good nor evil. Therefore, without an objective moral standard, good and evil cannot exist. All that can exist are personal or societal preferences. The atheist says:

A.      If evil exists, God doesn’t exist.

B.      Evil exists.

C.     Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

The theist counters by saying:

A'.    If God doesn’t exist, evil doesn’t exist.

B.      Evil exists.

C'.    Therefore, God exists.¹²

C. S. Lewis, a former atheist, says of the atheist’s problem of not having an objective standard of morality:

My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man doesn’t call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust? … Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that then my argument against God collapsed too—for the argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not that it just didn’t happen to please my private fancies.¹³

     On the other hand, if the atheist says that some things (such as torturing infants) really are evil and that there really is an objective standard, as most will admit when pressed, he must explain where such a standard comes from. Many atheists have tried to find an objective moral standard apart from God. Some proposed standards include Immanuel Kant’s “categorical imperative” and John Stuart Mill’s “greatest happiness” philosophy. According to Kant, an act is morally right only if one is willing to make it a universal law. In other words, Fred can determine whether it is right to steal John’s car by asking himself whether he would be willing to abide by the principle that everyone should be allowed to steal cars. Because chaos would ensue if such a principle were instigated, the act cannot be universalized and is, therefore, immoral. Those who hold to the “greatest happiness” principle believe that an act is moral if it leads to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.¹⁴ Thus, if stealing cars maximizes happiness for all, then it is a moral act. If it does not, it is immoral.

     The problem with these systems of morality is that they carry no sort of authority. Unless there is a Supreme Lawgiver, there can be no absolute, objective moral standards (moral laws). For unless moral law is dictated by one with authority and power, why should people pay any attention? If morality was simply the best or preferred way of doing things—just the way to maximize happiness for all—one has no reason why he must pay attention. That is, unless I am violating the laws of some being who has it in his power to declare what is good and just, and to punish me for wrongdoing, why should I even care if an action is “right” (or “moral”) or not. If doing something “wrong” (or “immoral”) brings me happiness (maximizes happiness for me) why should I do otherwise. If stealing your car brings me happiness and I can get away with it, so much the better for me. Unless morality is enforced—unless there are negative consequences to doing what is evil—it is not important whether I do what is good or not. If, on the other hand, a Supreme Lawgiver who has the power to punish me declares it wrong to steal from you, I will then have great motivation not to do so and to do what He says is right.¹⁵

Section VI: The Theist’s Simple Solution

     Because the atheist cannot generate the problem, and because the theist is the one who determines what he believes about God, the theist can formulate the premises how he wants. Thus, the theist has a simple solution to the so-called problem of evil:

1.       God is a being that is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.

2'.      Such a being would not allow evil to exist unless He has a morally sufficient reason for permitting its existence.

3.      Evil exists.

4'.      Therefore, God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting the existence of evil.¹⁶

     The theist has solved his so-called problem by modifying the atheist’s argument to reflect what he believes. A being is not morally culpable in allowing preventable evil if he has a “morally sufficient reason” for doing so. Thus, the problem is solved—evil exists because God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting its existence.

     The atheist may object that the theist has not demonstrated that God has such a morally sufficient reason. However, the theist does not need to demonstrate its existence any more than he needs to demonstrate God’s omnipotence. He can simply respond that, like omnipotency, one of the things he believes about God is that He has a morally sufficient reason for permitting the existence of evil.¹⁷ Thus, the problem of evil turns out not to be a problem after all.¹⁸

Notes